Pretty Vacant: Could the Lib Dems Move to the Centre-Right?
"The UK needs a centre-right party", but their identity is open for debate
This is a follow-up of sorts to my previous post, ‘What if the Lib Dems Became the Official Opposition?’. There, I explored the idea that Ed Davey discovered in the early hours of the 5th of July that not only had he and his party usurped the SNP, but also the Conservatives to become the second largest party in the UK on seats (not votes). What I also touched on briefly in that scenario is that whatever was left of the previous government would be a) a rump, and b) prone as they have been for years now to massive infighting about the future direction, even in a comically reduced state.
Any reverse takeover by Nigel Farage and Reform UK would, of course, be met with fierce resistance by some of the remaining contingent for a plethora of reasons, ranging from unwavering loyalty to the heavily tarnished Tory brand to simply not sharing his values, views, or vision for the future. The Times’ Tom Calver’s chart below illustrates on a simple left-right scale where existing MPs who have a ghost of a chance of actually being re-elected as the Labour ‘super-majority’ talk gathers pace (partly fuelled by their own ministers and online ads) sit on it:
It should also be stated that simply because there would be some ideological overlap and/or mutual respect between a particular figure and Farage that any kind of merger would be welcomed. Indeed, Kemi Badenoch, still seen as the favourite to dust herself off and lead the rubble of a bicentennial British institution, is against the notion, at least this side of the general election. Other colleagues have been far more receptive to it, and the membership, should they be granted the vote again, are generally of a similar mindset.
Either way, the ‘united’ broad church would quickly lose cohesiveness, especially should the likes of Caroline Nokes, Alicia Kearns, and Tania Mathias (Theresa May’s possible successor in Maidenhead) survive the electoral asteroid. Defections or formal splits on the right of British politics have rarely happened in the age of a post-war duopoly, but the rise of Reform UK, should it be sustained at the ballot box, would mean a handful of representatives elected on their own merits, rather than the Douglas Carswell or Lee Anderson method.
But enough about the Tories. What about the Lib Dems? Unlike the previous post, I don’t believe it’s strictly necessary for the party to be second on seats for this discussion to occur. Indeed, Davey’s contingent could be a little way back from the Tories and still find themselves answering questions regarding party positioning. The slightly unedifying first seven-way debate last week did at least reinforce the perception that there were four (or possibly five) parties to the left of Labour, and only one to the right of the Tories.
Destroying equidistance
Wera Hobhouse, the MP for Bath, had a very short-lived campaign in 2020 to be leader of the Lib Dems. Her pitch at the time, which only the most engaged of political nerds would’ve paid even the slightest bit of attention to, was to ‘abandon equidistance’, i.e. the idea that, particularly under the defeated Jo Swinson, the party had again tried to put themselves between Labour and the Conservatives as a third option that could simultaneously attract social liberals and economic centrists from both main parties.
There’s an argument to say it worked in the sense that the Lib Dems put on ~50% more support than in 2017, but the disastrous campaign, coupled with very loose targeting and the brutality of First-Past-the-Post, actually saw them drop a seat to just 11 net. A substantial chunk of those who did lend their votes are now back in Labour, with Keir Starmer seen as a far more boring/sensible/inoffensive option.
Meanwhile, the Tories continued to shed votes in every direction, a process that started early in the 2019-2024 administration, but one that accelerated rapidly after Partygate, by-election losses on huge swings, and then Liz Truss’ 49 days. These were events were then compounded by the sense of decaying public services, falling standards in public life, and raising the salience of issues like immigration whilst constantly failing to deliver on their promises.
The post-GE Commons will almost certainly be composed primarily of a monolithic Labour (with voices on the left utterly dwarfed by ambitious new MPs in the image of Starmer), a healthier number of Lib Dems (but quite narrowly comprised ideologically speaking), and the aforementioned ‘stretched’ Conservatives. British elections under FPTP are almost always won from the centre, but there won’t be the space for anyone else to occupy that position besides the new Prime Minister and his gargantuan government.
Voice for the voiceless
The Labour electoral coalition will actually be far more substantially ‘left’ than the one under Tony Blair in 1997, both a reflection of changing social attitudes a generation later, and of the party themselves. The governing party will doubtlessly face rebellions and factionalism regardless of the precise size of their majority, but the public would still expect an organised opposition party to at least attempt to hold them to account, full in the knowledge that on a day-to-day basis, pushing through legislation on all but the most contentious of issues would be a cinch.
Should the Tories disintegrate or simply move further to the radical right, a huge gap would open up. Even at the general election in three weeks’ time at the time of writing, there’ll be swathes of reasonably politically engaged people, especially in the south of England, who will choose not to vote Labour no matter what, either by not bothering to turn up to the polling station at all, or by placing their ‘X’ extremely reluctantly for the Conservatives or slightly less reluctantly for the Lib Dems.
Though less pronounced than in previous decades when party affiliation/identity was a much stronger factor in many people’s lives, there are still enclaves where Labour will struggle to find or maintain a foothold. Some of this cohort could be persuaded to vote for the Lib Dems as their more ‘natural home’, especially if the Tory infighting doesn’t abate. The increased media profile and commensurate political prominence would also help, as would the addition via defection of credible One Nation, socially liberal MPs like Alicia Kearns. It would represent one of the most powerful signals in politics that the party gaining in that case are in the ascendancy. To use Kearns as an example, she’s respected across the political spectrum for her views, especially when it comes to international affairs and her forensic scrutiny of David Cameron as chair of the foreign select committee.
Even without that fresh injection of talent from elsewhere, it’s perfectly plausible Ed Davey or his successor could find themselves casting their lines deep into the centre-right pool as perceptions shift and adapt to their revived relevance.
Policy, shmolicy
How would a centre-right Lib Dem policy platform actually differ from a ‘centre-left’ one? Arguably, there are small hints of it in the 2024 manifesto released earlier this week, but I’ll expound with other plausible areas, too:
VAT
Apart from the microstate of Liechtenstein and the very wealthy nation of Switzerland, most other European countries have a standard rate of VAT set at around 20% or a touch higher, and the EU doesn’t allow member states to set it below 15% in any case. In the UK, it has crept up and up in the half-century since its introduction, although curiously, it has never been increased by a Labour government - Gordon Brown actually reduced it by 2.5% in the last year of his premiership in an effort to curb a recession after the global financial crash.
Starmer and Reeves are unlikely to tamper with it, preferring instead to find more ‘indirect’ ways of raising more revenue. A centre-right Lib Dem opposition could make the argument, especially after a couple of years if the economic outlook isn’t beating current forecasts, that one way to ease pressure on the public and many SMEs battling high bills would be for a small cut in VAT. Though still considered a ‘luxury tax’ in some quarters, the vast majority of everyday goods and services are charged at 20%. It would be a gamble for Davey (who has a Master’s degree in economics) to advocate for it, as the cost for even a minor reduction would be in the billions. Nevertheless, it could be framed as providing a helping hand to struggling families and entrepreneurs alike.
Education
One of the more notable pledges before and during the election campaign has been Starmer’s pledge to remove private schools’ exemption from VAT on the fees parents/guardians pay to send their children to those establishments. Outside of the usual detractors opposed to any ‘meddling’ with private schools, the policy is proving to be popular.
Though that survey was conducted over a year ago, a more up-to-date one has seen minimal shifts since then. Currently, Davey is opposed to such measures, though that is more than likely a reflection of the political reality on the ground in seats the Lib Dems need to gain in order to become relevant in British politics once again. These tend to be wealthier, rural, and southern, which does contrast somewhat with the results above.
Instead, a centre-right focus could be on further improving outcomes in one of the few areas the current government actually made a half-decent fist of. That would advocating for the majority of the measures in the current manifesto: paying teachers more, having a mental health specialist in every school, widening the curriculum and extracurricular activities, reforming the way Ofsted operates, and so on. Education in and of itself tends to be a far less polarising topic outside of the ubiquitous question of where an MP and/or their children went to secondary school. Additionally, Munira Wilson is on the ‘right’ of the aforementioned narrow ideological band of the party, which would certainly help give more credibility to any shift in that direction.
International Affairs & Defence
Another area with a large degree of mainstream consensus currently, especially given the ongoing situations in Ukraine and Gaza. Neither war seems to have a swift resolution in sight, and both will be issues the incoming government has to deal with. Ostensibly, that is likely to be continued in pretty seamless fashion by Labour, though with perhaps a bit more bite in terms of advocating for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, dragged as the frontbench team have been to that position after badly mishandling things in the days and weeks following the IDF’s retaliation to the massacre on the 7th of October.
As for the Lib Dems, any party with Layla Moran as their Shadow Foreign Secretary/spokesperson is not going to suddenly pivot to supporting Israel. Being completely honest, a centre-right stance would almost be indistinguishable from the current approach, with the majority of peopled remaining advocates for safe routes for both Ukrainian refugees and BNO citizens seeing the ‘democracy’ in Hong Kong eroded in real time. That provision could be extended to Palestinians as well, though would almost certainly be met with greater resistance. Additionally, the affirmation to maintaining an independent nuclear weapons arsenal and restoring armed forces numbers back to six figures has broad agreement.
Housing
One of the biggest dividing lines between a Labour government and any main opposition party in 2024-2029 is almost certainly going to be on how to resolve the housing crisis that has dogged the UK for decades now, most sharply seen in the disparity regarding stated building targets and the paucity actually constructed. Starmer’s plan is to essentially twofold: both to build far more homes (1.5 million during the parliamentary term) and, crucially, to enact planning reform to override councils’ objections.
Previous grandiose schemes have fallen flat to a mixture of hyperlocal NIMBYism and the feedback backbench MPs receive in their own constituencies regarding doing anything that could possibly affect residents’ house prices. No UK political party has escaped this phenomenon, though it has been particularly pronounced in the Lib Dems. The bolder target in this year’s manifesto, which includes a sizeable portion of affordable and social dwellings, has largely only come about because of the intense pressure put on the leadership by the youth wing (Young Liberals), driven by a fear that not being ambitious in this regard would lead to a further disconnect with younger voters, many of whom are locked in a vicious circle of rents rising above their wages, coupled with house prices being unaffordable in an environment where demand hopelessly outstrips supply.
Here, the party would have to be careful. The popular Labour plan to ride roughshod over local concerns could move the dials considerably towards a more YIMBY attitude, or it could backfire spectacularly and lose them control of swathes of councils and seats at the 2028/2029 election. A cautious wait-and-see approach, whilst politically difficult for a number of reasons, would almost certainly be the order of the day.
Rejoining the EU (yes, really)
Last but certainly not least, another fascinating subplot after the conclusion of the election in three weeks’ time will be how Labour tackle relations with the EU. The popular received wisdom as I write this is that there’ll inevitably be a rapprochement of one kind or another. Starmer has ruled out rejoining the customs union or the single market this side of the 4th of July, but after it, all bets are off. Rightly or wrongly, most of the electorate now associate Brexit with being poorer, though Covid and the Liz Truss mini-budget shambles have simultaneously compounded and confused matters. It’s perfectly possible that, should the economic climate gradually improve in the next three to four years, the psychological association will actually start to unravel, and public sentiment will shift again.
Either way, the Lib Dems are almost certain to advocate for a toe-dipping drip-drip of measures, beginning with signing back up to the Erasmus+ scheme, and concluding with being back in the single market at the very least. A centre-right stance would focus less on the more intangible benefits of such a policy, and more on ones that tend to motivate people, namely healthier bank balances. If Labour are struggling, Davey, or his likeliest successor, current deputy Daisy Cooper, will turn up the heat on this issue, and there’ll be plenty of advocates in Starmer’s own parliamentary party who would be onboard with such a manoeuvrer.
Just vibin’
Ultimately though, the question posed in the title of this piece is kind of a red herring, in all honesty. The whole idea of ‘centre-right’ is a constantly moving target—what was once couched in those terms even 10 years ago would not be now. A chief example of this is Theresa May going into the 2017 election promising self-ID, with few in her party batting an eyelid either before or after that dramatic poll. Now though, it has become a much more contentious issue in the past two years or so in particular.
It comes down to perception—vibes, if you like. To cite another Conservative case, David Cameron was able to successfully appear to be liberal enough socially and conservative enough fiscally to steer his party into coalition government in 2010 and then eschew Nick Clegg and the other remaining 7 Lib Dem MPs in 2015. The reasons for this are numerous and well-worn, though it is worth restating that Cameron kept up this pretence whilst cutting more than Margaret Thatcher ever did, and being in hock to the right of his party (and UKIP) over holding a Brexit referendum.
Three years after that generation-defining outcome, Boris Johnson, in some ways, stood on a platform far to the left of Cameron’s or May’s—neither of his predecessors would’ve dreamed of the kind of spending commitments he pledged to make on public services, for instance. It was immediately successful in his case (again, the reasons why are complex), but is proof positive of how even half a decade in politics can feel like an aeon has passed.
As previously discussed, the rise of the Greens is set to continue in the next parliament, whether within or without the Commons. They are already beginning to steal the Lib Dems’ clothes, not just in certain policy areas, but how they organise. Simply adopting the Charles Kennedy-esque stance of being perceived as being to the left of the Labour government might not be a viable strategy, with that wing far more populated and divided in 2024 than it was in 2001-2010.
Nor, for balance, might a shift to the right, even if there is a potential vacuum there. Labour themselves could just as easily (and perhaps more credibly) take measures to be perceived in such a way. Liberalism has never meshed that well with that axis in any case, and in an increasing small ‘l’ liberal environment, the Lib Dems might just find an expanded niche in attempting to be critical friends to Labour, whilst also curbing their more authoritarian tendencies, projecting authenticity through a ‘soft’ ideological prism about ordinary people’s concerns. The vibes are, ironically enough, what might really matter.
Interesting article - I've enjoyed the two articles so far, found them providing much food for critical reflection.